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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NELDA P. JOHNSON,

I

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: September 17, 2007

V.

Case No. 070102050
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
motion has been fully briefed by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's
motion is granted.
^DISPUTED FACTS
The following undisputed material facts are based on the plaintiffs response to facts
alleged by defendants' in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, facts which were not controverted by
the plaintiff are deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.1

^ n d e r Rule 7, facts not controverted are deemed admitted. Where a fact is purportedly
controverted, but the non-moving party either fails to properly controvert the fact under Rule 7
(by providing ground disputing the fact with particularity and supporting the dispute by citation
to relevant materials) or fails to controvert the fact in a "genuine" way, a trial court may likewise
consider the asserted fact admitted.
In this case, the court could deem all of defendant's facts admitted by plaintiffs
wholesale failure to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B): "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
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1. On July 7, 2004, plaintiff joined Gold's Gym.
2. As a condition of membership, plaintiff was required to sign a contract ("Contract")
that included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release").
3. JPiaintiff read, signed, and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the
Release.
4. The Release executed by the plaintiff includes the following language:
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT
THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for any claims,
demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their
person, or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of
the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or Membei
hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all claims which may be
brought against them by Buyer or Member or on either of their behalf for such injuries of
claims aforesaid.
5. On July 12, 2004, plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym at about
9:30 p.m. and injured her knee.
6. Plaintiff's son S. Andrew Johnson, daughter Jocelyn Vance, and son-in-law Justin
Vance^yere present in the Gold's Gym parking lot when plaintiff fell.
7. /Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her injury and the defect in the parking lot that
causea n, aefendants had never observed or nt-en made aware of any dangerous condition, either
cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt parking lot.
8./rrior to plaintiffs fall, there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the

controverted[.]" Further, additional facts to be considered must be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials. The court specifically holds that as to
the facts hereinafter stated, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue.
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parking lot caused by cracks, holes, or broken asphalt at a time when there were more than 1,000
visitors per day at Gold's Gym.
9. During her visit to the gym only the day before her fall, plaintiff did not observe any
problems with the asphalt or trip hazards.
10. Plaintiff did not see the crack in the asphalt before she fell
11. jPlaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants4iad notice,of any dangerous
condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall.
DISPUTED FACTS THAT ARE NOT MATERIAL
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for summary
judgment and states that summary judgment "shall be rendered if..there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In
determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court views thefacts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
ANALYSIS

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted because (1) plaintiff released
defendant Gold's Gym from liability when she signed the Contract upon becoming a member of
the gym, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the
defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall. The court discusses each of these reasons in turn.
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I

PLAINTIFF RELEASED DEFENDANT GOLD'S GYM FROM LIABILITY
WHEN SHE SIGNED THE RELEASE INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACT UPON
BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE GYM.
Although Utah case law strirth, —--^-ues contract clauses that attempt to limit one's

liability, courts will enforce such terms if "the preclusion against negligence is clearly and
unequivocally stated." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah
1959). While the release of liability must be clearly and unequivocally stated, the rule of strict
construction does not require a specific reference to one party's negligence. See Freund v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371 (Utah 1990) (holding that an agreement that did not
specifically mention the effect of one party's negligence was nevertheless effective to release the
party from potential negligence because of the "broad sweep of the language."). Indeed, the Utah
Court of Appeals noted almost twenty years ago that "the contemporary judicial trend is tcT limit
the application of the strict construction rule[]" and that "the law of Utah should develop
consistent with this trend." Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667 (Utah
CtApp. 1989).
A.

The Release in the Contract expresses a clear and unequivocal intent
by the parties that the plaintiff would release Gold's Gym from any
liability arising from the use of the equipment, the facilities, or the
premises of the gym.

As noted above, if a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear and
unequivocal in its terms, a court will enforce the clause. In Russ v. Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d
901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this requirement in the
context of a release clause in which the plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and
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all claims, damages, loss and expenses'" and "for 'any death, accident, injury, or other
occurrence resulting from/Visits to [defendant's! JOD sue. j The court cited to Freund for the
principle that although the provision did not explicitly mention negligence of the defendant, "the
word 'negligence5 is not a talisman to enforce contracts avoiding potential liability." Id. at 905
(citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 370). The court stated, "A hold harmless provision is enforceable
when 'the broad sweep of the language employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in
which a party may be negligent'" Id. (citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371). The court found that the
provision clearly expressed the parties' intent to avoidjfae defendant's potential liability for
negligence and that it therefore was enforceable and barred the plaintiffs negligence claim
against the defendant. Id. at 906.
The language from the Contract signed by plaintiff is very similar to the provision at issue
in the Woodside Homes case. It states that "the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for
any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member...."
Although this does not explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may be negligent. The
language clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent by the parties that plaintiff will hold
defendant Gold's Gym harmless "from all claims[,]^ including claims alleging negligence on the
part of defendant Gold's Gym.
B.

The plaintiffs injury, which was allegedly caused by a defect in the
asphalt in the Gold's Gym parking lot, is covered by the terms of the
Release.

It is a well-accepted tenet of contract law that "[i]f the language within the four corners
Page 5 of 11

of the contract is unambiguous, the £arties['] intentions are determined from the plain meaning
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Central
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^[12, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n ambiguity exists where the language 'is
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999
UT 89,1fl3, 987 P.2d 48 (citation omitted). This court holds as a matter of law that the terms of
the Release are unambiguous, and that the term "premises" includes the parking lot in which the
plaintiff was injured.
One definition of "premises" in Webster }s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary is "a
building together with its grounds or other appurtenances." This is the plain meaning of the wordf
"premises" in everyday usage. Additionally, when taken in context, the use of the word
"premises" in the phrase "the use...of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is
located[,]" is not reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense or in a different
sense from the definition given above. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the parking lot is clearly
covered by the terms of the release, and her claim based on her injury in the parking lot is within
the ambit of the release. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim is barred as to defendant Gold's
Gym.
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THE DEFECT COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF WAS TEMPORARY IN
NATURE, SO HER FAILURE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD PRIOR
NOTICE OF THE UNSAFE CONDITION IS FATAL TO HER CASE.
The court holds that the defect complained of by the plaintiff was temporary in nature, so

a failure to establish actual or constructive notice to the defendants and sufficient time to remedy
the condition is therefore fatal to her case.
In premises liability cases, Utah case law creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those
that are temporary, and those that are of a permanent nature. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R.
Co., 2004 UT 80, f 19, 104 P.3d 1185. Where unsafe conditions are temporary, a business owner
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions and sufficient time after receiving
such knowledge to remedy the situation. Id. In contrast, where the unsafe condition is
permanent-which is defined as a condition which was chosen or created by the business owner or
for which he is responsible-the business owner is deemed to have knowledge of the condition.
Id. Plaintiff maintains that this case falls into the second category where an unsafe condition is
permanent and therefore notice of the condition is assumed. Plaintiff's memorandum in
opposition at 11. This court disagrees.
A.

The defect in the asphalt was temporary.

The Utah Supreme Court first articulated the difference between temporary and
permanent unsafe conditions in premises liability cases m Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975). The court stated that the first class of cases "involves some unsafe
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is
not known how it got there." Id. at 176 (emphasis included). In contrast the second class of
Page 7 of 11

cases described by the court "involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in
the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner of
use, which was created or chosen by the defendants (or his agents), or for which he is
responsible." Id. (emphasis included).
In Goebel, the plaintiffs injury was allegedly caused by a gap between rubber mats that
adjoined the road to a railroad crossing. 2004 UT 80, at ^ 6. The plaintiffs argued that the gap
was a permanent unsafe condition of which the defendant railway company was deemed to have
knowledge. Id. at ^19. However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the gap was not a permanent
unsafe condition because "the defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and [was]
'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its existence in the first place." Id.
at Tf20. The court found that because "the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel5 s injury was the
breakdown or mechanical degradation of something that was not alleged to have been negligently
created or installed[,]" the gap was therefore a temporary unsafe condition of which the
defendant must have had notice in order to be held liable. Id. at ^[21.
Although plaintiff argues that the defect in the asphalt was permanent and therefore
required no notice, the court finds that the defect was temporary in nature. It is clear that the
alleged defect was not chosen or created by the defendants, and plaintiff does not argue that the
parking lot was "negligently created or installed." Nor were the defendants responsible for the
crack or hole in the asphalt beyond a responsibility "in the context of maintenance, not for its
existence in the first place." Similar to the Goebel case, the defect that was alleged to have
caused plaintiffs injuries was created by the "breakdown or mechanical degradation" of the
Page 8 of 11

asphalt. This court therefore holds that the defect in the asphalt was an unsafe condition that was
temporary in nature.2
B.

There is no evidence that defendants had actual or constructive notice
of the defect-

When an unsafe condition is temporary in nature, courts require "evidence that the
defendant had some kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with evidence that the
defendant had that notice for a time sufficient for it to repair that condition." Id at ^21. In fact,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are
requiredto survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict." Id. at ^[22 (emphasis
added). In explaining the rationale for different notice requirements based on the nature of the
unsafe condition, the court stated, "[I]t is reasonable to presume that a party has notice of
conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions
that someone else creates..., that arise from malfunctions..., or that gradually evolve on their
own." Id.
In Goebel, the plaintiffs had no evidence that the defendant had actual notice, so they
argued that the defendant had constructive notice based on its failure to perform reasonable
inspections. Id. at f23. However, the court rejected this argument because the plaintiff and the
plaintiffs5 expert both failed to notice the gap themselves. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs argued
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time, so the defendant would have noticed the gap

2

This conclusion is butressed by plaintiffs opposition which notes, with attached
photographs, the "repair" of the condition after the event.
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if it had been paying attention and therefore would have had a reasonable time to repair it. Id. at
^[24. The court likewise rejected this argument because the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence
that the gap had evolved gradually as opposed to being formed suddenly. Id. at P25. The court
also stated that even if the gap had existed for a long period of time, there was no reason to
believe that the defendant should have noticed it since there was no evidence that the defendant
did not reasonably inspect the railroad crossing. Id. The court found that because the plaintiffs
had offered no evidence that the defendant knew of the gap or the length of time for which the
defendant had such notice, their "mere hypothesis that the gap may have existed for some
unknown length of time does not suffice." Id.
The court's analysis in Goebel is controlling in this case.
If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that the
defendant did not create (as in Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous malfunction
in an otherwise safe system (as in Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition
to degrade over time into a dangerous condition (as in the instant case), then evidence of notice
and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary judgment[.]
Goebel, 2004 UT 80, Tf 22, 104 P.3d 1185. As in Goebel, the plaintiff has produced no evidence
that defendants had actual notice of the defect in the asphalt. And while plaintiff has implied that
defendants did not conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, plaintiff has produced no
evidence to that effect. Plaintiff has also failed to produce evidence of the length of time the
defect in the asphalt existed. Because plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that defendants
did not reasonably inspect the parking lot, that defendants knew of the defect, or the length of
time for which the defendants had notice, the plaintiff cannot recover on her claim as a matter of
law.
Page 10 of 11

CONCLUSION
Based on the above facts and analysis, defendant's motion for summary judgment is
hereby granted. Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare appropriate order consistent with
this ruling and adopting this memorandum decision by reference.
Dated this

of September, 2007.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

JUL 2 200?

«B»

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: July 2,2007
Case No. 070102050

vs.

GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen
COMPANY,
1
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on the following motions:
1.

The Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on April 6, 2007.

2.

Defendant's motion filed on April 27, 2007, to strike Plaintiffs designation of
expert witnesses.

3.

Defendant's motion to compel discovery filed on April 30, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 13, 2005, Nelda P. Johnson ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Gold's Gym
and Peay Investment Company ("Defendants"), which the Defendants then filed answers to. In
her complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym and injured her
knee.
The parties filed an attorney's Rule 26(f) planning meeting report and stipulated
scheduling order wherein the parties agreed that the deadline for conducting fact discovery would
be November 15, 2006. The deadline for identification of the Plaintiffs expert witnesses and
production of their expert witness reports would be December 15, 2006, which is 30 days from

the completion of fact discovery. The deadline for identification of Defendant's rebuttal expert
witnesses and production of reports was set at January 15, 2007, which is 60 days after the
Plaintiffs disclosure of expert witnesses and production of expert reports. In the first week of
December 2006, the Defendants agreed to the Plaintiffs request to extend fact discovery until
January 30, 2007. On March 2,2007, Plaintiff filed her designation of expert witnesses, but then
negotiated another extension of time for providing her expert's reports.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2007. On April 24, 2007,
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants' summary judgment
motion.1 Defendants also filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses,
a motion to compel discovery, and a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for
extension of time. Plaintiff filed no other response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to strike the expert
designation.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
1. Defendants' Request for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party .. . ." Jackson v.

1

No request to submit for decision has been filed regarding Plaintiffs motion for a 45 day extension of
time. Plaintiff also has filed a motion to compel to which defendant has responded. No request to submit
for decision has been filed regarding this motion either.

Mateus, 70 P. 3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary Judgment "denies the
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no
reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail. Utah State University of
Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982).
As opposed to addressing the merits of the motion, plaintiff has sought only an extension
of time. Giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, particularly believing that plaintiffs
counsel did not receive the motion and memorandum until two days before the memorandum in
opposition was due, this Court grants an extension but not that sought by the plaintiff. Plaintiff
sought an extension of 45 days, although her own memorandum indicated that the pertinent
affidavits could be obtained in a matter of days, not weeks. Further, by now a period of 45 days
has expired.
Like the defendant, this Court is construing defendant's motion for extension of time as a
rule 56 (f) affidavit. There is no explanation within plaintiffs motion for extension of time as to
why discovery could not have been obtained earlier. Nor is there any real explanation as to why
the affidavits could not be obtained in a faster manner. The motion for extension of time is
completely silent as to any specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. The court
further notes that extensions of time for discovery have previously been granted.
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for extension is hereby granted only for the purposes of
responding to the merits of the motion and obtaining the two affidavits identified. This Court
considers discovery closed, unless stipulated to by the parties. Plaintiff shall have until July 9,
2007 to file any and all responses to the motion for summary judgment.

2. Defendants' Request to Strike Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses

Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part
and denied in part. As to any treating physician for whom records have previously been received
by defendants, such records may be considered reports for the purposes of rule 26.2 However, at
trial where no further report has been produced, the witness will be limited to those subjects
identified and supported in the medical records. Again, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the
doubt, any complete expert disclosures made prior to February 28th, 2007, 30 days after the end of
fact discovery shall be considered timely. It appears from the record that defendants gave an
extension to plaintiff to supply expert reports until March 18, 2007. While plaintiff did not meet
this exact date, it appears that the information concerning Dr. Wyman, including a fiill report and
previous testimony disclosures, has been made. As a result, defendant's motion as to Dr. Wyman
is hereby denied.
Plaintiff concedes that "Clay" and Leslie Thorton shall not be called as experts.
Accordingly, defendants motion as to "Clay" and Leslie Thorton is hereby granted.
Plaintiff asserts that plaintiffs expert designation filed March 2, 2007 complies with rule
26. Rule 26 (a)(3)(B) provides:
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is retained were specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case were whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the
witness or party.
As plaintiff points out, this report may be signed by the witness or the party (or the party's
attorney on behalf of the party). However, it appears plaintiff has failed to consider the

This seems to comport with rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s language requiring reports of a witness who "is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case . . ." since often treating physicians are employed firstly as a
healer and only secondarily as a witness, the reporting requirement of this rule arguably does not apply. However,
once a party seeks to introduce testimony which aids litigation but was not needed for the purposes of treatment, it
would appear that the party has placed that witness within the purview of the rule.

remainder of the rule which provides:
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary
of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding 10 years; the compensation to
be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witnesses testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.

The disclosures of the plaintiff barely contain the subject matter on which the experts are to
testify, with the exception of Dr. Wyman. As to all of the other experts, no summary of the
grounds is given for each opinion. The substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify are absent as well. This Court could perceive no facts stated in plaintiffs
disclosure. The qualifications of the witnesses is wholly absent. No indication is made as to any
publications, if they exist, authored by any witness. The compensation to be paid to the witness,
easily ascertainable, is absent. With the exception of Dr. Wyman, no list has been given of any
other cases in which the witnesses testified at trial or deposition within the preceding four years.
In sum, the disclosures are deficient and would not allow a party to assess the need to conduct
discovery connected with the expert testimony, and assuredly would not assist any party in
preparing for trial. Ultimately, the purposes of rule 26 have been circumvented. Both as to
initial disclosures, other disclosures, and expert disclosures, the purpose of the rules was to
encourage the free flow of information, not a hide matters until trial. David Jenkins is hereby
stricken as an expert for the plaintiff.
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part consistent with the
above.

3. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery
Defendants' motion to compel discovery remains unopposed by plaintiff. Further, the
motion provides a sufficient basis for relief. Accordingly, defendants motion to compel is hereby
granted, along with attorney's fees and costs for bringing the motion as requested.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above facts and analysis, the ruling of the court is as follows:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, until such time as plaintiff responds, or
July 9, 2007, whichever is earlier. Thereupon, defendant may submit issue for decision again.
2. Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part and
denied in part.
3. Defendant's motion to compel is granted.
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an appropriate order consistent with this
ruling and submit it to the court consistent with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 1/

day of July,

N. Mortensen
idicial District Court
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

RULING ON MOTIONS TO
RECONSIDER, STRIKE, AND COMPEL

Plaintiff,

v.

Date: November 29, 2007

GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case No. 070102050
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs motion to reconsider, plaintiffs motion
to compel, and defendant's motion to strike photographs. For the reasons which follow
plaintiffs motions to reconsider and compel are denied and defendant's motion to strike
photographs is granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action was commenced when plaintiff filed a complaint on April 13, 2005. The
parties entered into a stipulated scheduling order whereby fact discovery would end November
15, 2006 and expert discovery would follow. The parties agreed to an extension of fact discovery
until January 30, 2007. After all of the dates had expired, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on Aoril 6. 2007. In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff
did not file any substantive response, but instead filed a motion for extension of time to respond
to defendants' motion. No affidavit was submitted pursuant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. In fact, plaintiff never submitted for decision her motion for a 45 day extension
Pagel of 13
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of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. In addition to failing to submit her
motion, no response to the motion for summary judgment was filed within the 45 days initially
requested. Nevertheless, giving plaintiffs counsel every benefit, this court construed the motion
for extension of time as a rule 56(f) affidavit. This court allowed plaintiff to file a response even
though the motion for extension of time gave no explanation as to why discovery could not have
been obtained earlier, nor did it contain any explanation as to why opposing affidavits could not
be obtained in a more expeditious manner, and the motion was completely silent as to any
specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered.
Plaintiff did file a response to motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2007. Plaintiff
did not request oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2007 this
court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants summary judgment. An order
reflecting the memorandum decision was executed by this judge on October 17, 2007.
Apparently that same day plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to the court asking the court to rule on
the motion to reconsider before executing the order. However, the order had already been
executed.
On October 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration of order granting
summary judgment," along with a memorandum in support of this motion. The motion does not
assert that it is being brought pursuant to any rule under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
motion maintains that this court should reconsider its decision regarding summary judgment
arguing that: (1) this court wrongly concluded that plaintiff had released defendant Gold's gym
when she signed the membership agreement, (2) plaintiffs claimed did not arise from a temporary
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condition and therefore notice of the condition was not required, (3) that the issue of constructive
notice is a fact issue for the jury, and finally (4) that this court is the improper venue for this
cause of action.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE
Plaintiff has brought a motion to reconsider, a motion not enumerated by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This court concludes that when a trial court issues a decision which disposes,,
of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisiting the case by wav of a "motion to
reconsider." Accordingly, plaintiffs motion is denied.
For many years the appellate courts have been discouraging motions to reconsider. The
Utah Supreme Court in Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 If 18 n. 5 stated:
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider.
Although we have discouraged these motions, see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991), they have proliferated in civil actions
to the extent that they have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. We
acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however,
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make such motions to
reconsider routine.
Having ascertained that repeated suggestions had fallen on generally deaf ears, the court in Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24 cut down a wide swath of the motion to reconsider cheatgrass by holding
that "regardless of the motion's substance, post-iudpment ™~+;™o +^ r e c o n s i(i e r a n ( j 0 ther
similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not recognized by our
rules." The court noted, however, that "this holding applies to post-final-judgment motions to
reconsider; it does not affect motions to or decisions by the district courts to reconsider or revise
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nonfinal judgments, which have no impact on the time to anneal and are sanctioned by our
rules." The issue in Gillett was whether the Utah Court of Appeals had properly held that
plaintiffs notice of appeal was not timely. Thus the holding of the Supreme Court of Utah in
Gillett addressed a motion to reconsider and its ability to toll the time for appeal. Accordingly,
the holding of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gillett does not truly address motions to
reconsider brought before a final judgment is entered. That is the circumstance ncie.
The remaining cheatgrass, but for a few select stalks, should be hewn down. This court
does not believe that all motions to reconsider are in fact sanctioned by the rules when placed
before the trial court pre-final-judgment. In noting the fact that the rules sanction, arguably, a
motion to reconsider, the Utah Supreme Court in Gillett referenced rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, a close reading of the rule shows the sanction of motions to
reconsider, otherwise known as revision of prior decisions, to be limited.
Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(emphasis added). Thus, the rule contemplates that other forms of decision, such as a
memorandum decision, are subject to revision only when remaining claims or rights and
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liabilities have not been adjudicated. However, in cases such as/he present one where the grant
of summary judgment disposes of all claims, there is ita-good reason that motions to reconsider
should be recognized under this rule. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules 52
and 59, provide sufficient avenues of redress for the extraordinary circumstance alluded to in
Shipman.
For example, it may occur that, between the grant of summary judgment and the signing
of the final order, precedent is established by an appellate court which brings into question the
validity of a trial court's ruling. Likewise, it may occur that counsel ascertains after a ruling, but
before a judgment is entered, that both parties failed to cite controlling and determinative
precedent which likely should change the outcome of the decision. In either event, under rule 59
a party could make a motion for a new trial claiming an error in law. See rule 59(a)(7);
Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, f40.(trial court can grant new trial
where "prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice").1 Also,
should new evidence be found which could not have been, with reasonable diligence, discovered
prior to the ruling on the motion, a motion for a new trial is a proper remedy. See rule 59(a)(4).
Utah's appellate courts have already held that a motion for a new trial following summary
judgment is procedurally correct and available to litigants. Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson,
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990). With this remedy readily available, no reason exists to

1

In fact, in the past courts have construed motions to reconsider as motions for a new
trial. Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995).
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perpetuate motions to reconsider in cases that have been fully adjudicated on motion.2
Further, the Gillett court's dicta concerning motions reconsider pre-final-judgment fails to
address the holding in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). In Drury, the
Utah Supreme Court held that once a trial court had granted a motion for a new trial, and where
no inadvertence, mistake, or irregularity appeared in connection with obtaining the order, the trial
court had no authority to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider or review its own ruling.3
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Gillette provides further arguments to disallow
pre-fmal-judgment motions to reconsider as well. First, the court restated:
In fact, post-judgment motions to reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the
Utah rules of appellate procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gillette, 2006 UT 24 f 6. In point of fact, motions to reconsider per se are not found in the rules
at all. The court then went on to state:

2

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide other avenues of redress to provide a trial
court ample opportunity to correctly address an issue. Rules 59(e) and 52(b) both allow a court
to alter or amend a judgment, amend findings, and alter a judgment consistent with the changed
findings. While rulings on summary judgement do not entail findings per se, a court must
determine, or find, that no genuine issue of dispute remains.
3

The Drury court noted:

If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why
should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for rereconsideration, asking the court to again reversed himself? Tenacious litigants and
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically a judge could
go on reversing himself periodically at the entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad
infinitum.
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663.
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We are now persuaded that it is time this practice comes to an end. In our system, the
rules provide the source of available relief. They "[are] designed to provide a pattern or
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon."
Id at % citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Specifically
recognizing the onerous burden placed upon trial courts by vaguely labeled motions, the Gillett
court concluded:
Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to
determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available.
Parties can no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider
and relying upon district courts to construe the motions within the rules.
Id. Unless the holding of Gillett is extended to nre-fmal-iudgment ruling which adjudicate all
claims as well, the burden upon the trial courts will remain. As shown here, there exists no
reason to limit this analysis to post final judgment scenarios.
The reasons for implementing a rule disallowing motions to reconsider when a ruling has
completely disposed of a case are highlighted by plaintiffs motion to reconsider in this case. For
the most part plaintiff is simply re-arguing her case. To some extent plaintiff is attempting to
supplement the record, perhaps hoping that the appellate court will not be able to make a
distinction between the record before the trial court at the time summary judgment was granted
and evidence or arguments presented subsequent to the memorandum decision.4 It does not
advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow parties to reargue or re-present matters to the court when significant time has alreadyj>een expended in a
memorandum decision.

4

An appeal in this matter has already been filed.
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This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had an
exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The
entirety of the discovery period in the case had already concluded. Knowing that a grant of
summary judgment was possible, this court would assume that all evidence within plaintiffs
possession or control would have already been brought before the court. Additionally, even if
information has been presented in the motion to reconsider which was not presented before the
court made its memorandum decision in September of this year, at a minimum a party should
have to show that somehow evidence was not reasonablv attainable prior to the court's decision
before the court should consider it in any way. Plaintiffs memorandum is silent on this issue,
except for the allegation that certain pictures taken long after the event, and arguably irrelevant
for determination of this case, were for ambiguous reasons unavailable.5
For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is hereby denied.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER LACKS MERIT
Even if the court were to consider the motion on the merits, the motion should be denied.
Re-argument and assertion of new facts. Plaintiff provides nothing new in the motion
to reconsider concerning this court's ruling that the release signed by the plaintiff relieved Gold's
Gym of liability in this matter. Plaintiffs simply re-argues her case. The arguments were not

5

For example, while in opposition to a motion to strike plaintiff argues that defendants
should have subpoenaed the photographs, plaintiff fails to recognize that this same argument
obliterates any reasonable argument for reconsideration based upon the photographs. Could not
plaintiff have subpoenaed the pictures herself, thus having them in her possession in a timely
manner to oppose a summary judgment motion?
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persuasive before, and they are not persuasive now.
In her original opposition to the motion for summary judgment plaintiff claimed:
Plaintiffs injury arose from the second class of a dangerous condition.
This second class of premises liability arises where the defendant is responsible for the
condition, he is deemed to know the condition and no proof of notice is necessary, [sic]
Plaintiff continues to pursue this theory in the motion to reconsider; that is, that the cause of the
fall was not a temporary condition. This court simply disagrees with plaintiffs contention,
although the court notes that in plaintiffs motion to reconsider she attaches her own declaration,
where in paragraph 7 she refers to the place of her fall as "broken asphalt." In other words, it
was asphalt which originally was not broken. That which is broken and can be repaired is
transitory, and therefore temporary. Thus, her own declaration undermines her stated position.
Plaintiff submits a declaration of the plaintiff, which is not really a matter to be
reconsidered, but new evidence for which the plaintiff gives no reason could not have been
presented in the initial motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff even tries to insert the hearsay
statements borne of our own private investigatory efforts. These statements are inadmissable.
Additionally, pictures not previously produced showing the scene of the accident four years after
the slip and fall are submitted for "reconsideration," even though the court has never considered
them.
Plaintiff now argues that the slip and fall resulted from a design defect, although there is
not now, nor within the motion was originally presented to the court, any evidence whatsoever
that any defect that existed was by design or existed because of the way the asphalt was laid.
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Again, in the plaintiffs own words, it was "broken asphalt."
Plaintiff also claims that the matter should be reconsidered because defendants have
failed to respond to discovery. Plaintiff points out that she filed a motion to compel in May of
2007 and now asks the court to rule on the motion. Because plaintiff could have asked this court
to rule on the motion to compel long before summary judgement was granted, any plea now to
re-open this case for further discovery is simply unreasonable. If plaintiff had forgotten that she
had filed a motion to compel, it was clearly put squarely to her attention when this court in its
initial memorandum decision denying summary judgment noted that the motion to compel had
been filed but not ruled upon because no notice to submit ever had been filed with the court. See
July 2, 2007 Memorandum Decision pg. 2, note 1. Thus, even where the court pointed out that
all plaintiff needed to do was file a notice to submit two months prior to ruling on this matter,
plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs arguments that defendants have tied her hands
fail.
The sum and substance of plaintiff s opposition to the original summary judgment, which
is now put forth again, is that speculation should rule the day. No material evidence of notice of
a dangerous condition was brought forth. One thousand patrons crossed the same parking lot
without complaint daily. Plaintiff herself, both the day before her fall and at the time she fell, did
not see any defect in the asphalt. Plaintiff claims that notice after the fall, as well as other events
after the fall, support an inference of notice prior to the fall. This court disagrees.
Plaintiff is further speculating on how long the condition existed. Plaintiff is asking this
court to submit the matter to a jury so the jury can speculate both on what caused the plaintiffs
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fall, and if it was the condition of the parking lot, how long the condition had existed. In Goebel
the court stated:
[Not] only will the jury have to speculate about whether [defendant] had notice of the
dangerous gap in the first place, it would also have to speculate about whether
[defendant] had notice far enough in advance to repair the gap before [plaintiffs]
accident.
Goebel v Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co , 2004 UT 80 \ 25. As stated, this court will not submit a
case of speculation to the jury for determination, since as a matter of law where speculation is
employed the evidence does not preponderate one way or another.
Challenge to venue. Plaintiffs challenge to venue in the American Fork department of
the Fourth District Court is meritless. First, Utah Code Ann. §78-13-10 does not preclude
transferring this case to the American Fork department.6 The venue provisions of the Utah Code
provide that an action must be tried in the proper county. American Fork is in the same county as
Provo.
Plaintiff claims that the jury pools between Provo and American Fork will differ. There
is no basis for plaintiffs contention. In fact, the jury pools and how they are selected are
identical between Provo and American Fork. A single clerk, located in the Provo courthouse,
compiles the jury pools from within Utah County for all juries in the county, whether located in
Provo, Spanish Fork, Orem, or American Fork.
Lastly, a party cannot wait until a final determination of the case and then challenge the
venue where the case was decided. Plaintiff has simply waived this argument.

6

The case was assigned due to the recusal of the previously assigned judge.
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL IS MOOT
Because the court finds plaintiffs motion to reconsider to be procedurally defective, and
because the court does not find a sufficient basis to set aside its previous memorandum decision
and order, the issue of plaintiff s motion to compel has been rendered moot and is therefore
denied.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff claims this court cannot consider the
motion to strike unless the court first grants the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff makes this claim
even though the pictures at issue are appended to the motion to reconsider and form the basis for
the relief sought. This conclusion is illogical. The point is whether this court should consider
them or strike them.
Any materials not previously submitted to the other party prior to the initial motion for
summary judgment should not be filed with the court. Plaintiff has not explained why she could
not subpoena the photographs from the individual holding them long prior to the motion for
summary judgment. New evidence should only be considered when a properly brought motion
for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is brought before the court.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is denied both procedurally
and upon the merits. Plaintiffs motion to compel is denied as being moot. Defendant's motion
to strike the photographs submitted with the motion to reconsider is hereby granted. Defendant's
counsel shall prepare an order consistent with rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 29th day of November, 2007.

p David N. Mortensen
|h District Court Judge
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH

I
I
NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
I
)
)
>
vs.
]
I
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT ]
COMPANY
]
Defendant.
)

Attachments t o
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Case NO:

070102050

Judge: Hon. David N. Mortensen

COMES NOW S. Austin Johnson counsel for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson and hereby attaches
the documents attached to her Memorandum filed in support of her motion to reconsider the
memorandum decision granting summary judgment, entered by the trial court on September 17,
2007. These attachments were filed with Appellant Johnson's motion to reconsider, filed October
10, 2008. These documents are submitted as the parts of the record to be used on appeal.

1

State of Utah
County of Utah

)
) ss.
)

Declaration of Nelda Johnson
Comes now Nelda P. Johnson, plaintiff in this cause of action, and hereby declares the
following facts to be true, based upon her own knowledge, recollection and investigation,
subject to penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Utah:
1.
I signed the contract to become a member. I did not think the clause applied ot
the parking lot outside. I believed it only applied to usinjg the gym, the equipment, and
their trainers.
2.
It was 9:30 pn at night when the accident happened. I did not see the ground very
well. The evening was already getting dark.
3.
The day before, the one time I wen to the gym, I di not park in the same spot. I
did not walk ver the area where the cracks were so extensive. I went in the morning to
the gym.
4.
When I received the contract, the sales person did not point out the release, did
not explain the contract, and did not give me time to read it. I believed it was only for
me to become a member so I just looked at the price and the length of time I was
committing to. She was talking to me about her husband, how he spoke Spanish and sells
car insurance. She was giving me his address when I was signing the contract.
5.
The release is on the back side of the page and it was not conspicuous to me. I
thought my signature was just to join the gym. I did not have any opportunity to bargain
or negotiate the contents of the membership agreement, other than price and length of
membership.
6.
I went to Gold's Gym and took pictures within a few weeks of the fall. The brace
and crutches were given to me by the emergency room the night I fell.
7.
Then, I went back and had pictures taken in May 2005, about nine months after
the fall. Gold's Gym still had done nothing to repair the broken asphalt.
8.
Finally, I went back to the property four years after the fall. I took pictures of the
asphalt. They show where sporadic repairs were made, leaving other big holes in the
asphalt. The line of repaired asphalt still shows where I fell. These pictures are attached.
9.
I investigated the person that the gym said redid their parking lot. He denied it.
He says he lived in the same ward as /7^y P<°Us'>an- He had him install a home theater.
The invoice was for that service. He never laid any asphalt or pavement at the gym.

10. Other persons had called him about this. I understood he meant the other attorney,
someone from their office, had called him about this same thing. The defendant knows
the fact is false and they have not corrected it.
I declare the above facts to be true under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
Utah on this £_ day of October, 2007.
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DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON
1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-Gj-S

2

--0O.0--

3

(The deposition commenced at 12:47

P.M.)

4

--0O0--

5

TROY PETERSON

6

having been sworn to tell the truth

7

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

8

testified as follows):

9

--0O0--

10

EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. JOHNSON:

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Troy C. Peterson.

14

Q.

And what is your position at Gold's Gym?

15

A.

Vice president.

16

Q.

Do you have any ownership --

17

A.

I do.

18

Q.

-- interest?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What percentage ownership?

21

A.

Body Firm, 10 percent.

22

Q.

How is Body Firm related to Gold's Gym?

23

A.

It operates, the entity located at 460

24
25

Would you state your full name.

North 900 East, doing business as Gold's Gym.
Q.

How many facilities does Body Firm

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6629

DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON
1

operate?

2

A-

One.

3

Q.

Just the one at 900 East?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Do you have any ownership in any of the

6

other Gold's Gyms throughout the 15 in the state of

7

Utah?

8

A.

Yes, I do.

9

Q.

What percentage do you own in the other

A.

Between myself any wife, the equivalent of

10

15?

11
12

10 percent company-wide.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

Some would be in my wife's name, some

15

would be in mine.

16

Q.

Who is your wife?

17

A.

Adrian Peterson.

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

(Off record).

20

Q.

21

before?

What's her name?

Off the record.

(By Mr. Johnson) Have you given a deposition

22

A.

Yes, I have.

23

Q.

How many times?

24

A.

Two o r

25

Q.

Okay.

three.
Has i t

ever been

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
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related
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for us?
A.

I think I have them.

3 ||

Q.

Would you like to bring them in?

4 ||

A.

Yeah.

5 ||

Q.

That would be great.
(Short break taken) .

6 ||
7 || Q.

(By Mr. Johnson) Did you bring any other

8

records with you that relate to Nelda Johnson or her

9

injury or a claim made?

10

A.

11
12

That was all I could find.
MR. JOHNSON:

Exhibit: 1.

Okay.

Let's mark this as

Should I make some copies?

13

M S . THUET:

Yes. Would you?

14

(Short break.)

15

Q.

(By Mr. Johnson) How long have you been the

16

vice president of Gold's Gym?

17

A.

11 years.

18

Q.

Are you the only vice president?

19

A. N o .

20

Q.

21
22

What's your specific area over which you

serve as vice president?
A.

Probably, to be more clear, in the

23

corporation, the vice president.

24

company, my title would be CFO.

25

Q.

The overall, for the

What are your duties as CFO?

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6629

DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON
1

A.

Handle all the financial matters.

2

Payments.

3

matters.

Accounts payable.

Receivable.

Loans.

Legal

All fall under that umbrella.

4

Q.

What does CFO stand for^

5

A.

Chief financial officer.

6 1

Q.

Do you have any responsibility over

7

maintenance of the property?

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

A.

A lot of that gets put under my umbrella,

Q-

Is there anybody else with more

also.

responsibilities than you over maintenance?
A.

CEO is Scott Felsted.

But I think he

would defer to me as far as maintenance.
Q.

Okay.

Let me hand you the document that

15

you brought for us today.

16

as Exhibit 1 to your deposition.

17

And we'll have that marked

(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)

18

Q.

Can you tell me what it is?

19

A.

It's notes on Nelda's membership.

20

Q.

What created these notes?

21

A.

Our billing company is Paramount.

22

they create the history.

23

ability to make notes in there also.

24
25

Q.

And

And our office has the

Do you know who at Paramount would have

made this computer record?

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
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1

Q.

Okay.

11

Have you ever discussed the fact

2

that she was injured in your parking lot with anybody

3

else in Gold's Gym?

4

A.

In the last three or four days, yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

Prior to the last three or four

days, have you ever discussed it?

7

A.

No, sir.

8

Q.

Will you tell me what this document is

9

that I'm handing you now.

10

A.

(Reviews

document).

In your

11

interrogatories, you asked for invoices regarding any

12

kind of asphalt repair.

13

we moved our offices about a year and a half ago.

14

we made a mess of our filing system.

15

believe to be the last repair on the asphalt.

16

some seal coating on 9th East.

17
18

MR. JOHNSON:

And after much searching --

This is what I
We did

So we made that copy.

Okay.

We'll mark that as

Exhibit 2 to your deposition.

19

And

(Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)

20

Q.

(By Mr. Johnson) And Exhibit 2 is a check,

21

apparently, made out to Leading Edge Construction;

22

is that correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Dated September 2005?

25

A.

Correct.

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6629

[1

DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON

1

Q.

2

12 fl

Do you know who identified the work that

Leading Edge Construction did in September 2005?

3

A.

I don't understand the question.

4

Q.

Who gave the scope of work to Leading Edge

5

Construction?

6

A.

That would have been myself.

7

Q.

Do you remember what work you asked them

9

A.

Some seal coating.

10

Q.

At the time you made that request, did you

8

to do?

11
1 2

1

consider the injury that Nelda Johnson suffered in
J your parking

lot

in 2004?

1

13

A.

No, I did not.

14

Q.

Why did you ask them to do seal coating?

15

A.

They actually approached me, saying it

16

looked like the parking lot could use a little

17

freshening up.

18

thought it was appropriate, and asked them to do the

19

work.

20
21
22

Q.

And I asked them to give me a bid; and

Do you recall who it was that approached

you ?

1
A.

I don't remember his name.

And I'm not

23

100 percent sure that this is the correct name of the

24 I

company.

25 1

guarantee it.

I'm -- I'm pretty sure, but I couldn't
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13 II

Q.

Do you know anybody that did the work?

A.

I don * t.

Q.

You had never seen them before or after1

they did this work?
A.

They called a couple of times about a

coup!le of other parking lots that we had.

And I

decl.ined their bid at that time.
Q.

And the company that called you, was their

name Lead ing Edge Construction?
A.

I believe so.

J

Q.

Do you know what city they're located in?

A.

I don't.

Q.

When was the last time that you had any*

I

contact with them?
A.

J
1

It would have been the day that we wrote

this chec k after they had done the work.
Q.

And you still don't have any recollection

of an ind ividual's name?
A.

I don' t.

Q.

Do you recall why they said it looked

like

the E)arki]rig lot needed some repair?

|

A.

They didn't say anything specific, no.

Q.

Do you recall why you approved their bid?

What work did you think it needed?
A.

They gave me three or four bids.
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14

1

told them to go ahead on a couple of them, what I felt

2

were fair and equitable.

3

Q.

Do you recall any work that you felt

4

needed repair, or any condition that you felt needed

5

repair?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

What did you describe to them as the work

8
9

that they were to do?
A.

I'm not an asphalt expert, but seal

10

coating is just filling in the tiny cracks so they

11

don't expand and get bigger.

12

Q.

Were all cranks filled in?

13

A.

I believe so, yes.

14

Q.

What percentage of the parking lot did you

15

have them fill cracks in?

16

parking lot?

17
18
19
20

A.

Over what percentage of the

Well, they would have filled everything in

in the whole parking lot that had a small crack.
Q.

Okay.

Why did you feel it was important

to fill in cracks in the parking lot?

21

A.

So they wouldn't get any bigger.

22

Q.

Do you feel that cracks may pose dangers

23

to patrons?

24

A.

There's more of an aesthetic fix than any

25

kind of danger.
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Q.

1
2

15

So do you ever fill cracks if you feel

that they pose a danger to patrons?

3

A.

We would do that, yes.

4

Q.

Have you ever seen a crack in the parking

5

lot that you thought might pose a danger to a patron?

6

A.

I have not.

7

Q.

Do you have any plan for preventive

8

maintenance on the parking lot?

9
10

A.

If it needs it, we would do maintenance in

all areas on an as-need base.

11

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And you've been working with Gold's Gym

12

15

So your only plan, then, is just as

needed?

for 11 years?

16

A.

I have been vice president for 11 years.

17

Q.

And you made the lease with regards to the

18

Gold's Gym at 900 East in February of 1995; is that

19

correct?

20

A.

Scott Felsted signed that lease, yes.

21

Q.

And are you aware of any maintenance done

22

on the parking lot since February of 1995, other than

23

this resealing done in September of 2005?

24
25

A.

To the best of my memory, we redid thei

parking lot in the summer of '97.
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I do not know.

3

Q.

And so, then, you didn't have any work

Do you know who did that?

4

done from the summer of

5

is that correct?

g

A.

'97 until September of 2005;

From our records, that would appear

7 II correct.
Q.

And do you ever remember inspecting the

9 II parking lot between the summer of ' 97 and prior to
10

II September of 2005 to determine whether it needed

11

II repair or maintenance?

22
13

A.

Occasionally walked through the parking

lot and looked at it.

24

Q.

Did you ever prepare a report about that?

25

A..

No.

26

Q.

Did you ever comment on the condition of

17

No, I did not.

the parking lot to anybody?

28

A.

No, I did not.

2g

Q.

Did you ever have an opinion that it

20

needed repair?

22

A.

No, I did not.

22

Q-

And after you got this report of an injury

23 || in October of 2004 that's described in Exhibit 1, did
24 || you go out and look at the parking lot at that time?
25 ||

A.

I don't even remember receiving the
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1

their payment status?

2

A.

Usually, yes.

3

Q.

Is there any other basis for which they

4

would be listed on the stop light status?

5
6

19

A.

Occasionally we have members get in

altercations.

7

Q.

So discipline?

8

A.

Discipline them, breaking club rules, we

9
10
11
12

won't allow them in the club.

Those are usually the

issues.
Q.

Have you ever considered whether Nelda

Johnson broke any club rule?

13

A.

I have not, no.

14

Q.

Have you ever taken any disciplinary

15

action against Nelda Johnson?

16

A.

Not to my knowledge, no.

17

Q.

Okay.

Do you agree that Gold's Gym has

18

the responsibility of maintaining and keeping in good

19

repair the parking lot?

20
21
22

A.

Our lease on 900 East, I believe, reads

that way, yes.
Q.

So the owner of the property does not have

23

the responsibility to maintain or keep in good repair

24

the parking lot at 900 East?

25

A.

I haven't read the lease close enough to
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22

to injuries in the parking lot?

2

A.

I'm not an attorney.

3

opinion on that.

4

Q.

Okay.

I don't have an

Have you ever had any training with

5

regard to what should be done to identify risks in the

6

parking lot of dangerous conditions?

7
8
9

A*

Not past common sense.

First call 911,

and getting some emergency people to the facility.
Q.

So you haven't had any training that would

10

help you identify when the condition of the parking

11

lot may be dangerous, or when it may not be dangerous?

12

A.

No, I have not.

13

Q.

Do you keep any record of phone calls

14

received by your office by your

15

offices?

administrative

16

A.

No, we don't.

17

Q.

Have you given any training to people that

18

answer the phone in the office about what to do when

19

somebody calls and complains about an injury they've

20

suffered at Gold's Gym?

21

A.

Generally it's taken care of at the club

22

level with an incident report.

23

to take those.

24

corporate office.

25

Q.

The staff is trained

We don't get a lot of calls to the

Okay.

So you haven't trained anybody in
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1

4

|

In a deposition, it's our opportunity to

Q.

2

ask you any question we can think of that may lead to

3

discoverabl e information in this lawsuit.

4

thing we as k is that you tell the truth.

The only
II

Are you under any medication or anything

5
6

that may impair your ability to understand my

7

questions?

8

A.

9

Q

10

No.
Okay.

What kind of education do you have?.

'

A.

I have an Associate's Degree in

1

electronics

,11
12

Q.

Where did you get that?

13

A.

uvsc.

14

Q.

What year did you graduate?

15

A.

2001.

i6

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

No .

is

Q-

Have you ever been in the military?

19

A.

No .

20

Q.

Are you married?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

What's your wife's name?

Are you in the military?

MS. THUET:

23

Objection.

JJ
His wife's name is

not relevant.

24
25

MR. JOHNSON:

jj
Well, it is, because we may

l
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S c h o o l . - . . . • •

2

Q.

What's your position at Gold's Gym?

3

A.

Maintenance director.

4

Q.

How long have you worked for Gold's Gym?

5

A.

Since July of 1999.

6

Q.

How long have you been the maintenance

7

director?
Since I have worked there.

8
9
10
11

Q.

So you were hired for the job as

maintenance director?
A.

I -- I was hired as the only maintenance

12

technician at the time, and have always been in charge

13

of the department.

14

Q.

Okay.

Who hired you?

15

A

Troy Peterson.

16

Q

What's his position?

17

A

He is our chief financial officer

18

Q

Is he still the CFO?

19

A

I believe so.

20

Q

What were your duties -- when you were

21

hired, what were you told would be your duties as

22

maintenance -- as in charge of maintenance?

23

A.

To maintain the equipment and building.

24

Any duties to maintaining the company, equipment or

25

building.
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JL

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I have had training through our

7

What training have they given you?

J3

manufacturers of our equipment.

4

training in other areas of construction and technical

f5

skills.

\6

And then I have

Q.

What areas of construction have you worked

|8

A.

Electrical.

9

Q.

Okay.

7

in?
Plumbing.

Those two, mainly.

When you were hired, were you given

110

any instructions about the asphalt in the parking lot

1|1

area?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Since being hired, have you ever been

i4

given instructions about maintenance you should be

15

concerned with related to the parking lot or pavement?

16

A.

Where?

17

Q.

At the 900 East Gold's Gym.

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Have you ever inspected the parking lot or

20

pavement at 900 East at Gold's Gym?

21

A.

No.

^2

Q.

Is there anybody else besides you who

23

would be m

charge of maintaining the parking lot or

£4

pavement at Gold's Gym, 900 East Gold's Gym parking

25

lot?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q•

Do you consider that within your duties,

3

the inspection and maintenance of that parking lot?

4

A.

5

to be done, yes.

6

Q.

7
8
9

If -- if I am asked to, yes.

Okay.

If it needs

How would you determine if it needs

to be done?
A.

I'm not qualified to make that decision,

so I would call an outside source to look at it.

An

10

asphalt company.

11

Q.

Have you ever called an asphalt company?

ll2

A.

No.

13

Q.

Who reviews your performance?

1,4

A,

Troy Peterson.

15

Q.

Have you ever had any reviews with him?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

How often do you have reviews?

18

A.

Quarterly.

19

Q.

Does your salary depend on reviews?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Are the reviews ever for the purpose of

22

possibly increasing your wages?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

What are the purpose of the

reviews?
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1

A.

I would say internal, how the company is

2

doing internally.

3

Q.

What are your concerns with internal

4

performance of the company for which you may be

5

reviewed?

6

A.

7
8
9
10

I would say the -- the state of equipment,

and the building at each location.
Q.

Okay.

Have you ever inspected the asphalt

pavement or parking lot at any facility owned by
Gold's Gym?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Which buildings have you inspected the

13
|14
15

asphalt?
A.

In West Jordan, our location in

West Jordan.

U

Q.

Any others?

17

A.

No.

is

Q.

When did you inspect it at West Jordan?

19

A.

I don't know the exact time.

It was

20

sometime in 2006.

21

Q.

Do you remember the season?

22

A.

I want to say it was spring.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

A member reported that we had a pothole in

25

the parking lot.

Why did you inspect it?
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10

1

Q.

What did you find when you inspected it?

2 II

A.

There was a pothole there.

3

Q.

You found one?

4

A.

Uh-huh.

5

Q.

And what did you do with it?

6

A.

We barricaded it off until the asphalt

7

company, which was called by the property owner, fixed

8

it.

9

Q.

So you called the property owner?

10

A.

Yes.

l|l II

Q.

And had them fix it?

12

A.

Uh-huh.

lt3

Q.

Do you remember who the member was that

14

had reported the pothole?

15

A.

I do not.

16

Q.

Had there been any accident involved with

17

the pothole?

18

A.

Not to my knowledge.

19

Q.

Did you fill out any written document

20

describing your inspection and findings?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Did you just give a verbal report?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Who to?

25

A.

Troy Peterson.

Ron Littlebrant.
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1

Q.

Anybody else?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

How much did it cost to fix the pothole?

4

A.

I don't know.

5

Q.

What -- approximately how much surface

6

area of pavement was covered with new asphalt?
A.

7

To my knowledge, the pothole was roughly,

8

I would say, 18 inches in diameter, and three-quarters

9

of an inch deep.
Q.

10
11

covered?
A.

12
13

And why did you believe it needed to be

To -- so there wasn't any injury or

accident to any of the members or their property.

M

Q.

Did you believe, if it was not covered,

15

that it may pose a risk of danger to property owners

ie

or members?

17
18
19
20
21

A.

I think with further neglect, it could

Q.

What guidelines do you use to determine

have

whether asphalt needs to be covered or replaced?
A.

I think I answered that.

I would -- I

22

would -- I don't have the skill or knowledge to make

2j3

that decision.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Yes.

So you call an outside contractor?
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1
2
3 ]]

Q.

When do you decide that it's time to call

an outside contractor with regard to pavement?
A.

It's obviously in the report of there

4

being a problem, a potential problem.

5

looked at and addressed.

6

for it.

7

12

Q.

Okay.

It would be

That would be the main case

Are you aware of any other reports

8

of problems or potential problems with asphalt, other

9

than the one at West Jordan in 2006?

JlO

A.

NO.

11

Q.

How many properties does Gold's Gym own or

JL2

operate?

13

A.

Currently, 15.

14

Q.

And that's in which counties?

15

A.

Utah, Salt Lake.

3i6

Weber County?

I'm not sure what county that is.

1[7

Q.

Okay.

iB \\

A.

Uh-huh.

l|9
2|0
2|1

locations.
Q.

Is Bountiful considered

Bountiful?
And we have two southern

One in Cedar City, and one in St. George.
And is it within your duty to assure that

all of the parking lot are safe at all 15 locations?

22

A.

Yes.

2(3

Q.

Have you ever been sent to any classes by

2|4 II Gold's Gym to learn how to better perform your duties
25 II as maintenance director?
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13

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

How many times have you gone to classes?

3

A.

I would say two times.

4

Q.

How long were each of the classes?

5

A.

Three to five days class.

6

being six, roughly six hours.

7
8

Each class

Q.

Okay.

Did any of the classes deal with

maintenance of the property?

The parking lots?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

For the property at 900 East in Provo, do

11

you consider that the owner of the property has any

12

responsibility regarding maintenance of the parking

13

lot?
I -- I don't know --

14
15

Q

Okay.

16

A

-- what his requirement is there.

17

Q

Who is the owner of that property?

18

A

I don't know .
So you've never gone to anybody at the

19
20

owner and asked them to do any maintenance, or

21

reported any problems to them?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

With the machines, what kind of

24

maintenance do you do with the maintenance in Gold's

25

Gvm?
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1

A.

We do repair and scheduled maintenance.

2

Q.

How often do you do repairs and scheduled

3

maintenance?

4

A.

Repairs are done when needed.

The

5

scheduled maintenance items are done as to the

6

manufacturer's recommendations, generally.

7

Q.

8

give a ballpark?

9

A.

10

What are the recommendations, if you can

They're very, very broad.

as often as a week.

11

Q.

Okay.

Some could be

Others could, be every year.
How much -- do you do the

12

maintenance yourself, or do you have other people that

13

do it?

14
15

A.

I have employees that do that.

I do some,

but mainly employees now.

il6

Q.

How many employees do you have under you?

17

A.

10.

18

Q.

How much time do you think it takes you

19

and your 10 employees to, during the year, to provide

$0

repairs or scheduled maintenance to the equipment?

21

What percentage of your time?

?2

A.

I don't understand the question.

23

Q.

Out of your work year for you and your 10

^4

employees, what percentage of time do you spend doing

25

repairs or scheduled maintenance to the equipment?
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A.

I would -- 95 percent.

Q.

So that's primarily your job, then?

A.

Yes .

Q.

Okay.

Have you ever asked any employee to

have any re sponsibility over the pavement or parking
lot outside ?

II

A.

No.

Q.

Are you aware of any injuries to any

II patrons of Gold's Gym caused by the machines or

1

equipment?
A.

No.

Q.

Are you familiar with the contract from

Gold's Gym?
A.

No.

Q-

Tell me what you've heard about the --

strike that

Tell me, who is Kandi Negrete?

Who is

that?
A.

She is the manager of the gym on 900 East.

Q.

Do you know anybody else from Gold's Gym

who is goin g to testify today?
A.

Yes .

Q.

Who is that?

A.

Troy Peterson.

n

Q.

Anybody else?

Jl

A.

Lynette Felsted.

rl

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
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II

DEPOSITION OF NATE LOFTIN
1

Q.

Who are they?

2

A.

I've given Troy's title to the company.

3

What are their positions?

Lynette Felsted is an owner.

4

Q.

Anybody else?

5

A.

Not to my knowledge.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

Do I -- would you be more specific,

Q.

Have you heard of any injury suffered by

please?

10
11

Do you know about the accident

complained of in this litigation?

8
9

Nelda Johnson at Gold's Gym at 900 East?

12

A.

I don't know the details of an injury.

13

Q.

So do you know how she alleges she hurt

14

her knee?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Has anybody discussed this lawsuit with

18

A*

Not -- not in any detail.

19

Q.

Okay.

17

20

16

you?

Has anybody ever told you that she

claims she fell in a crack in the parking lot?

21

A.

Three days ago.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

Troy Peterson.

24

Q.

Tell me what he told you.

25

A.

He told me that I would need to be

Who told you that?

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
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1

prepared for a deposition on this date, because of the

2

incident.

3

Q.

4

So would that be January 29th, 2007, was

the first time you heard about this incident?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

What did he tell you to do to prepare for

7

this deposition?

8

A.

9

He didn't have any instructions on

preparation.

10

Q.

What have you done to prepare?

11

A.

Nothing.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

You just came with the knowledge

1

il

that you have?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Thank you.

16

1

plaintiff in this case alleges she fell?

17
18

A.

1

So do you know where the

Q

'

No.
And you haven't looked at the parking lot

19

at 900 East to see where you think she might have

20

fallen?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

And nobody told you where?

23

A.

No .

24

Q.

Have you ever been told that there was any

25

complaints about the condition of the parking lot at

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6629

II
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18

900 East in Provo?
2
3

No
Q.

Have you ever been instructed about what's

4

required to maintain a parking lot in a safe

5

condition?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Do you know what injuries or accident

8

Nelda Johnson suffered?

9

A.

No

10

Q.

In some answers to interrogatories, your

11

name was given as somebody who may have information

12

about maintenance and repairs to the parking lot at

13

900 East in Provo, Utah.

14

maintenance or repairs ever being made to the parking

15

lot there?

Do you know of any

16

A.

I don't know specific dates on those.

17

Q.

Do you know of some having been performed?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Tell me if you can approximate the year

20

when that repair was done.

21

A.

To my knowledge, approximately 2004.

22

Q.

Do you know what was done?

23

A.

Just a resealing, a surface resealing of

24

the parking lot.

25

Q.

Do you know if it was before or after
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DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED
1

Q.

2

his name?

3

A,

Is he the one that's on television?

4

Q-

Yes.

5 I

A.

If he is, that's -- I think that's the guy

6

Do you know who Billy Banks is?

Is that

on television, but I'm not sure.

7

Q.

8

aerobics?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Is Tae Bo similar to kick boxing, do you

A.

I -- I -- I don't know enough to really

11

14

Have you ever seen his routine, the

Not really, unh-unh.

know?

12
13

Okay.

know.

That's not my expertise.
Q.

Okay.

So have you had any -- exercised

15

any supervision or control over any maintenance done

16

to the property at Gold's Gym?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Would you know whether a crack in the

19

asphalt in the parking lot could become a dangerous

20

condition or a hazard for patrons?

21

A,

I haven't noticed anything.

22

Q.

Okay.

But would you -- would you believe

23

that one could become one if it were allowed to become

24

a big enough crack?

25

MS. THUET:

Objection to the extent it
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DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED

10

puts facts not in evidence.
2 II

A.

I imagine it would be.

3

Q.

Okay.

And so do you believe Gold's Gym

4

has the responsibility to not allow the parking lot to

5

become that kind of a hazard?

6

A.

7

the parking lot.

8

Q.

9

I am not sure if we are even in charge of

Okay.

You're not sure if Gold's Gym is

responsible to maintain the parking lot?

10

A.

I don't think we own the building.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

So I'm -- I'm not really sure.

13

Q.

You signed the lease, didn't you?

14

A.

I don't remember.

15

Q.

Let me show you a document dated February

16

3rd, 1995.

17

Investment Corporation and Body Firm Aerobics.

18

you seen this document before?

19
20

A.

And this is a lease between Peay
Have

I've signed a few documents, so I -- can I

look for my name?

21

Q.

Sure.

22

A.

Yeah, I guess I have.

23

Q.

So that's your signature at the bottom of

24
25

this lease?
A.

Uh-huh.

Yeah.

DepomaxMerit Litigation Services
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6B29

I signed my name.

DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED
1

Q.

And

2

the n a m e

3

as p r e s i d e n t .

in that lease, B o d y F i r m A e r o b i c s

listed u n d e r
Is that

the tenant, and t h e n y o u

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

D o e s B o d y Firm A e r o b i c s

l o c a t i o n other t h a n the one at 900

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

as G o l d ' s

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

Okay.

is

signed

correct?

4

6

11

o p e r a t e any

other

East?

I don't think s o .
A n d is Body F i r m A e r o b i c s

the

same

Gym?

Under Paragraph 8.2 of the lease,

12

it says:

13

shall keep and maintain the premises and all

14

improvements thereon, including the exterior, parking

15

lot, et cetera.

That tenant's sole cost and expense, tenants

16

What did you do, or what have you done as

17

an owner of Gold's Gym to maintain the parking lot at

18

900 East?

19

A.

I personally have not dealt with that.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Unh-unh.

22

Q.

So have you ever directed that there

Do you know who did?

'2 3

should be any program for inspecting the parking lot

24

to make sure that it didn't have any hazard, hazardous

25

condition?
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DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED

1

A.

Not me p e r s o n a l l y ,

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

I just do the aerobics.

4

Q.

Okay.

12

no.

And have you ever been involved in

5

any meeting with the officers in directing that there

6

be that kind of a program?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Have you ever received any report from

9
10

anybody as the president of Gold's Gym of an
inspection of the property -- of the parking lot?

11

A.

Not to my knowledge.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

MS. THUET:

I would just like to clarify

14

that she's not signed as the president of Gold's Gym.

15

That lease is signed as her position as the president

16

of Body Firm Aerobics.

17

THE WITNESS:

18

Q.

19

an o f f i c e r

Okay.

(By Mr. Johnson) Is there anybody else who is
in G o l d ' s G y m other

than

yourself?

20

A.

I don't

21

Q.

Do you consider yourself to be in charge

22
23
24
25

know.

of Gold's Gym at 900 East?
A.

It's really more of a company.

I just do

the aerobics.
Q.

Okay.

Do you know what testimony you're
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DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED
1

Q.

Okay.

18

So at that time would you expect

2

that somebody would investigate that complaint of an

3

injury?

4

A.

I cannot speak for someone else.

5

Q.

But in setting policy for the people that

6

work under you in -Gold's Gym, would you expect that

7

they would investigate a complaint of an injury when

8

they receive a complaint?

9

A.

Yeah, I would hope so.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

Do you know if anybody investigated

this complaint of an injury?

12

A.

I don't know.

13

Q.

When would you like to be told of a

14

complaint of an injury if one was received by Gold's

15

Gym?

16

A.

Immediately.

17

Q.

So as the president, you would hope to be

18

informed?

19

A.

20
21

Oh, well, that's not my department.

.-. Q. . So -A.

So I -- I -- honestly, I can only deal

22

with so much.

And I just have my little department

23

that I deal w i t h .

24

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you.

25

are all the questions that we have.
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I think those
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DEPOSITION OF KANDI NEGRETE
Q.

10

Who provides the interpretation of the

contract?
A.

I don't understand the question.

Q.

Who explains a contract to a new member?

A.

We have the contract in writing, and we

ask the member to read it.
Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

Do you explain it?
It's not our job to explain the

contract.
Q.

Okay.

Do you understand it?

A.

I believe I understand the contract.

Q.

Okay.

Have you ever seen Nelda Johnson

before today?
A.

Is this Nelda Johnson?

Q.

Yes, it is.

A.

She looks familiar.

Q.

When do you think — do you recall when

you've seen her before?
A.

It's definitely been some time.

I don't

recall exactly when.
Q.

Okay.

As you do your walk-through, what

are you looking for?
A.

What are we looking for?

Q,

With regard to maintenance.

A.

Anything that's obviously dirty, in need

D e p o m a x M e r i t Litigation Services
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DEPOSITION OF KANDI NEGRETE
1
2

Q.

Okay.

Were there any other assistant

managers besides yourself in July of 2004?

3

A.

4 L

No.
(Cell phone interruption.)

5

Q.

(By Mr. Johnson) Do you recall what you were

6

doing as far as your employment in July of 2004?

7

A.

I don't understand the question.

8

Q.

What were your duties at Gold's Gym as

9

assistant manager in July of 2004?

10

A.

Selling memberships.

11 I.

Q.

Okay.

So as an assistant manager, you

12

didn't concern yourself very much with maintenance of

13

the property, or premises, or equipment?

14

A.

Not much.

15

Q.

So your duties were more focused on sales?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

When you became manager, did your

18

duties then include responsibility for maintenance of

19

equipment and premises?

2C

A.

I didn't -- I don't do maintenance.

21

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Does he work under you?

25

A.

I don't know if you'd call it under me.

22

Do you know -- let's see -- Nate

Loftin?
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE

A.

They're all in Orem.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Brad Peay?

Do you know Brad Peay?
I know Brad Tregeagle.

I

don't know Brad Peay.
Q.

Okay.

How much education have you

completed?
THE WITNESS:
MR. JEFFS:

Is that a relevant question?
He's entitled to get some

background information.
A.

I had two years of college.

Q.

BYU?

A.

No.

Q.

What did you study?

A.

Architecture.

Q.

Did you ever work as. an architect?

A.

Part time.

Q.

How many years did you work part time as

University of Utah.

an architect ?
A.

Probably eight.

Q.

And what were those years?

A.

Would have been 1953.to 1961.

Q.

Now, what have you done as your career

since then, basically?
A.

Well, at that time, I was working for

Anderson Lumber as an estimator, plan drawer.

Alison Seifridge, CSR, CRI, RDR
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And I

Q By Mr. Johnson -LYNNTREGEAGLE
left there, and formed my own company, Tregeagle Fi:
Floors, a floor covering business.
Q.

Where was that located?

A.

That's on 9th East just south of Gold's

Q.

In Prove?

A.

In Prove.

Q.

So is it in the same

A.

It's across the street.

Q.

Is there, oh, a hamburger place across the

Gym.

I own that building.
—
South of 450

North.

street there?
A.

No.

The hamburger place you're talking

about would have been Stan's Drive-in.
Q.

Right.

A.

Across 9th East.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Behind the bank.

Q.

Okay.

I'm acrcss

450 North.

And so how many years have you had

the floor covering store?
A.

I opened that in 1961.

Q.

And it still does business now?

A.

No, no.

Q.

When did it stop doing business?

•A.

Oh, boy.

1983.

'86.

Alison-Self ridge1, CSR, CHI, RDR
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Along through there

Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE

11

Q.

Okay.

A-

And I don't know what year it was.

I have

a hunch it was 1358, but I'm not positive about that.
Q.

Did you get to provide any floor covering

at any time -A.

No, I didn• t .

Q.

-- in Gold's Gym?
Did you have any other career other than

running your floor covering business until 1986?
A.

I became an artist for a while.

And then

I went into the construction business, constructing
homes on my own personal property.
Q.

What did you build?

A.

What did I build?

Q.

No commercial building?

A.

Not in Provo.

Q.

Have you done commercial building

Homes.

Residences.

elsewhere?
A.

No, I haven't.

I haven't.

Q.

How many homes have you built?

A.

Probably 10.

Q.

Have you had any duties or work

Nine.

Jtfine.

responsibility with regard to the Gold's Gym property
at any time since 1953?
A.

Have I had?

Alison Selfridge, CSFT, CRI, RDR
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Q By Mr. Johnson-LYNN TREGEAGLE
that stuff.

09:53

G y m .

•

16

That was all the responsibility of Gold's

•

•

Q.

.

Okay.

So ever since the property was

leased to them, you don't think Peay Investments has
had any records at all about the condition of the
6

parking lot?
A.

7

As far as I'm concerned, they didn't.

Because it was Gold's Gym's responsibility to take
care of it.
Q.

10

Okay.

Do you know if there would be any

11

records that would discuss the condition of the

12

parking lot when you leased the property to Gold's Gym

13

in

14
15

Q C, q 9

A,

No.

Other than -- other than what is in

the lease.

16

Q.

17

' A.

18

Q.

—

13

A.

No.

20

Q.

Do you know when the last picture of that

21

Were there pictures -No.
when you leased the property?

property was taken?

22

A.

I have no idea.

'23

Q.

Do you have any records where maybe there'

24
?q

No idea.

might be some pictures of the parking lot?
A.

I've got a picture of the front of the
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
away?

No.

A.

MR. JEFFS:

No, you don't know?

Or

no,

she did not.
A.

I don't know.

Q..

Do you feel you have more knowledge of the

workings of Peay Investments than she has?
A.

I don't think so.

Q.

You think she knows more than you do?

A.

I have no clue as to what she knows.

She's had it for two years more than I have.

She

might have learned a little bit more than I did.
Q.

So at this time, do you know of anybody

who has ever patched or paved the parking, lot at
Gold's Gym in Provo?
A.

Not prior to 1995.

Q.

Okay.

And do you know of anybody who has

done it since 1995?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

So virtually you don't know of anybody who

has ever done any work on the parking lot at Gold's
Gym?
A-

No.

Hasn't been my responsibility to

know.
So vour answer is nor
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
property.

That's a little overbroad.

Q.

(By Mr. Johnson)

When we say "maintenance

to the property," I mean, are you aware of any
maintenance to the parking ior at Gold's Gym prior to
1395?
A.
net.

w

JL

Z

I cign ' t have any knowledge prior to 1995.
y c: a

A.

jr d • j w .

Q.

Okay.

A.

If I did, I've long, forget it.

Q.

And you're not aware of any preventive

maintenance to the parking lot since 1995; is that
correct?
A. .
Q.

No .
Let just ask yon, with your, floor covering

business, I would assume you were familiar with what
might constitute a trip hazard?
THE WITNESS:

That doesn't pertain to

this, does it?
MR. JEFFS:
Q.

But if you know.

(By Mr. Johnson)

So tell me when you

would install a floor, how much immediate change in
elevation would you consider a trip hazard?
A.

I don't want to answer that.
MR. JOHNSON:

the court also.

Well, we'll certify that to

I have the riqht to ask the court.
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Q By Mr.Johnson -LYNNTREGEAGLE
T-'F WITNESS
*. •* !T-

in tr.is c-.—'
expec•t

r. c

<r ,~.

T-

r> cr

JEFFS:

*7 ,-

Are you expressir g a n c p i n i c n

- c v;fta t a zrip

o r; r - c y

V " 7 l i

hazard is 7

I

Do you

as an e x r> e r z ?

THE WITNESS :

N c.

Never

— oOoM R . JEFFS:

I don't think -- I think it's

clear he d o e s n ' .t have aivy background
what cons t i t u t e s
Q-

(P t u

a

or e xperienc :e on

trip hazard.

Mr. Johnson)

Do you feel , as a

prope rty owner, do you feel you have any
respo nsib ility t.o make sure a property is not

— does

not h ave a t r i p hazard i"or people that us e the sa me
prope r t v 7
MS . TKUET:

Objection to the extent i t

calls for a 1 e g a1 conclc s ion .
A.

I do n r t feel that I need to aiiswer th a t .

Q.

Do y ou feel as

a business owner that you

have a du ty to make prop erty safe for bus:~ness
inviteses?
MS . THUET:

Ob j e c t i o n .

Calls for a 1 eg a I

concl*isio.n .
You zan
A.

answer.

I do n't want to answer that.

I won f t.

answei; it
11
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QByMr. Johnson-LYNN TREGEAGLE
M R . JO?iMS ON :

Too,

if v

,^-s 1

re

"

53|

We'll certify that one.

goinc1 r c do a motion, we might

as

well

have it c L 1 in t h e r e .
(Quest
(Q.
you

1lave

3

invitees?

duty

.i on

c erzified)

Do y ou

feel

to

property

ul a

ke

as

a business
safe

owner

for

that

business

)
Does ?e ay

for

.

7

ivestments have any policy now

i.nspe Ct ing prop er ti< =s co make sure that the

premi se s ar e safe f or bljsiness

invitees?

A.

As far as - know, no.

Q-

Do you ha'/e any maintenance program for

lies owned by Peay
parki ng I ot at prop *"* r'

II

Investments?

Would y ou state an answer out loud?
A-

I haven 't aiiswered yet.

Q.

Ckay.

A.

I don't krJOW that I want to answer that .

II

But. .MR. JEF FS:

You'll need to answer that, if

you k n o w.
A.

maint e n a n c e

There i 511 f t any -- any program, as far as
of the {>-ar ki ng lot is concerned.

There

isn't a n y tliat I know of
Q.

Are you a V-. ar e of any accidents

p
or fa -1--1ing in a parking
persoi -\ s t "r "* ping

1
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from

lot at any

j|

Q By Ms. Thuet-LYNNTREGEAGLE

Gold1 S
{I
II

^
^

N e v e i",

0-

Also,

o \T. ,

the

"> O »"1 ^ '""
TV- e
x _ • r; .^ -

'IS ||

Nc- •-•er.
.
n a v e there

been any chanaes

*
.
p r c p e r r v wh ere Go ."
.ci's
Gym

to the

sits,

since

exteric r ?
c h e r e been

Have

any crlanges in the

build i n q ?

0.

Uh-huh.

delet.ions z>\~\ t h e
A.

Ha ve

p r o p e ty
r

there been

of Gold' s Gym?

T ii e r e w a s a small

south s id e of t h e

any additions or

addi tion put on the

b u i 1 d inq .

Okay .
I don ' t -know what year it was -

•n

Q.

And any oth er changes to the property

on

which Gol Q s Gym sits s ince, say, 19 9 5?
MR. JEFFS:

You're i n clucling the parking

area?

Q.

•(By Ms. Thu et)

Inciud ing the parking

area .

A.

The new par king area?
Yes .

A.

Okay.

building th ere.

Ye.s . There was a McDonalds

Jj

And they took '"the -— took the

J!

McDona 1 G 3 b uiiding out.

And we pa ved that as parking

lot, a n d £id ded it. to -- and Gold's Gym signed a lease
'

on that...
•—H

Alison Selfridge, CSR, CRI, RDR
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Q By Ms. Thuet - LYNN TREGEAGLE
go bacn and find out when they

I'd have
siqned the lease

on that McDonald parking lot.

not familiar with vjnen
Q.

Okay.

I'm

tha~ happened.

And where was this Gold's Gym -- or

the McDonalds building located in relation to the
Gold's Gym building?
A,

It. was the far north end of the property

on the opposite end, starting at the south.
•^Gold's Gym on the south.
Salon.

You got

Then Paul Mitchell Beauty

Then Little Caesars.

Then it was McDonalds on

the north end of that.
Q.

And dc you have any estimate as to when

that occurred?
A.

Roughly 2002.

2004.

I'm not sure.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Without going back and checking the

records.
MS. THUET:

Okav

MR .- JOHMSQN:

w

Thank Y O U
)u have any other

V W

questions?
MS. THUET:

No.
oOi

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR.

JOHNSON:

n

Let me eiS& vou

a

>;ew,
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;t t o

follow

uo.

Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
10:50

Was the old McDonalds in ihe same row of

1
2

buildings as the Gold's Gym and the hair salon school
A.

They was a separaz^

Q.

Okay.

building.

Is there still a building there

where it used to be?
6

A.

No, no.

7

Q.

Is there still a McDonalds at the

8

property ?

G

A.

No.

10

Q.

What's the furthest north building on the

11
12
13

property now?
A.
each other.

It -- the three buildings are adjacent to
Gold's Gym on the south, and then.Paul

Mitchell, and little Caesers -- who have moved out.
Their lease expired, and they've moved out now.
16
1^
18

that's all the buildings that are
Q.

on that property.

And'there isn't a building further north

that's some kind of a food establishment?

19

a

No

20

Q.

That's not stuck to

21

A.

Well f

22

And

—

there's a building there, but it

doesn't belong to Peay Investment.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

There's a Hoqi Yogi in there.

know who owns that.
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I don't

Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
.^•t"

Q.

v c u r o r o p 6 r t. v

And rhe McDcnaIds was actually physically

stuck no the nortn wail of Little Caesars?
A.

Mo, i"io .

11 was separate.

Q.

Hew far was is it separated from there?

A.

ot

•.Q.

Okay.

And so then there was a parking lot

in that 50 to 60 feet from the north wall of Little
Caesars?
A.

Right.

Q.

To the McDonalds?

A.

Right.

Q.

And now you've just totally removed the

McDonalds building?
A.

And paved it over.

Q.

When you paved, that parking lot after you

removed the McDonald building, hew much pavement did
you do?

Do you know?
A.

I don't have any idea.
Well, as far as I know, just the -- just

the building itself.
Q.

Okay.

So when you took down the building,

there was a hole there, and you just covered the
hole --

Alison Self ridge, CSR, CRI, RDR
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
A.

£ i qnz .

Q.

-- where the building

52

Right.

*as.

And yen don't know of any repaving or
paving that you aid on any of the parking lot other
chan where you had -~
A.

I'm not aware of any.

Q.

-- taken out the building itself?

A.

I'm net aware of any.

Q.

So any pavenent that you did at that time

probably was 50 to 60 feet north of the corner of
Little Caesars?
A.

That's right.

Q.

Do you remember if that work was done

before or after this injury -- this alleged injury in
July of 200-J ?
A.

I wouldn't be sure of that.

Q.

Would you have reoords that might still

reflect that?
A.

I can go back and check out when we paid

Q.

Okay.

A.

And that sort of thing.

Q.

Would your records show who did the

for it.

pavement ?
They probably would,

AlisorrSelfridge; CSR, CRI, RDR
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Q By Mr: Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
10:55

1
2
Q,

Why?

A.

Because

i~'s standing up there.

Somebody

could crip over ic.
6

C?.

So that's a trip hazard?

7

A.

CcuId be.

5"

Q.

If you have a pothole, and there's an edge

Q

10

of the pothole that creates a three-quarter inch
ledge, does that cause you concern?
A.

11

. There isn't one there that I —

12

of.

13

whether it wouldn't be. :

I'm aware

And i can't answer whether it would be, or

14

Q.

You said if there's a three-quarter inch

15

elevation change in the asphalt, than that's a trip

16

hazard.

Do you consider --

17
18

MS. TKUET:

misstates his former testimony.

19
20

Q.

A.

Do you consider a

I just told you that a smooth surface

could be a trip hazard.

23
24

(3y Mr; Johnson)

half-inch elevation change a trip hazard?

21
22

Objection to the extent it

®*v

Okay.

That wasn't my question.

Do you

consider a half-inch ledge in asphalt to be a trip
hazard?
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE
A.

I ' c! have

Q..

OKay.

ro

say

56

yes .

On une several occasions you've

viewed :he parking loi, nave you ever viewed it
specifically tc determine whether there might be a
trip hazard?
A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

Have you ever expressed any opinion to

Gold's Gym of any condition that you feel they should
maintain?
A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

And you've never viewed the property with

that purpose?
A.

No.
I have no other questions.

MR. JOHNSON:
Thank you.
MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

MR. JOHNSON:

We're done.

Thank you for coming.

(Signature not reserved.)
(The deposition concluded at 10:58 a.m.)
--GOO~-

(Right
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Ch. 13

CONDITION AND USE OF LAND

§ 343

k. Where warning inadequate. There will, however, be
special situations in which the possessor has knowledge of facts
from which he should realize that an ordinary warning will not
be sufficient to notify the licensee of the danger, or to enable
him to protect himself against it. Thus where the possessor
knows that the licensee is blind, illiterate, or a foreigner, or a child
too young to be able to read, it is not enough to rely upon a
posted notice to give warning of the danger, and the possessor
may still be required to exercise reasonable care to give adequate
warning in some other way. In extreme cases, as in the case of
the blind man, he may even be required to give physical assistance
to enable the licensee to avoid the danger.
I. Dangers known to licensee. The licensee, who enters
land with no more than bare permission, is entitled to nothing
more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers which he
will encounter if he comes. If he is warned of the actual conditions, and the dangers involved, or if he discovers them for
himself without such warning, and fully understands and appreciates the risk, he is in a position to make an intelligent
choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is sufficient to
justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining.
Therefore, even though a dangerous condition is concealed and
not obvious, and the possessor has given the licensee no warning, if the licensee is in fact fully aware of the condition and
the risk, there is no liability to him.

TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS
OF LAND TO INVITEES

Vvfti*! qVffc

§ 3 4 3 . Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by
Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land
if, but only if, he
^huu
t<yvIt5 WcrfW
(a) knows or by the exercisejpf reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect^ that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it, and
Pee Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross Beferenoes
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^^7£j
^ fails to exercise reagonable care to protect them
st~fv<^ ^yagaijjgt the danger.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. This Section should be read together with §343 A,
which deals with the effect of the fact that the condition is
known to the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact
that the invitee is a patron of a public utility. That Section
limits the liability here stated. In the interest of brevity, the
limitation is not repeated in this Section.
b. Distinction between duties to licensee and invitee. One
who holds his land open for the reception of invitees is under
a greater duty in respect to its physical condition than one who
permits the visit of a mere licensee. The licensee enters with
the understanding that he will take the land as the possessor
himself uses it. Therefore such a licensee is entitled to expect
only that he will be placed upon an equal footing with the possessor himself by an adequate disclosure of any dangerous conditions that are known to the possessor. On the other hand an
invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will
exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry,
or for his use for the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled
to expect such care not only in the original construction of the
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees
which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover
their actual condition and any latent defects, followed by such
repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary
for his protection under the circumstances.
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the
duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous
conditions which are known to the possessor, and are likely not
to be discovered by the licensee. To the invitee the possessor
owes not only this duty, but also the additional duty to exercise
reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe for
the reception of the visitor, or at least to ascertain the condition
of the land, and to give such warning that the visitor may decide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation, or may
protect himself against the danger if he does accept it.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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will fail to protect himself notwithstanding such knowledge.
See § 343 A and Comments.

TITLE D. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS
OF LAND TO LICENSEES
§ 3 4 2 . Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if,
but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of
the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the
condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition
and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know
of the condition and the risk involved.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. The words "the risk" denote not only the existence of
a risk, but also its extent. Thus "knowledge" of the risk involved in a particular condition implies not only that the condition
is recognized as dangerous, but also that the chance of harm
and the gravity of the threatened harm are appreciated.
b. If the licensees are adults, the fact that the condition
is obvious is usually sufficient to apprise them, as fully as the
possessor, of the full extent of the risk involved in it.
On the other hand, the possessor should realize that the fact
that a dangerous condition is open to the perception of child
licensees may not be enough to entitle him to assume that they
will appreciate the full extent of the risk involved therein. As to
this, see § 343 B.
e. The possessor's duty also arises if he has had peculiar
experience which enables him to realize the risk involved in a
condition which he should recognize as unlikely to be appreciated by his licensee as an ordinary man or where he knows
See Appendix *or Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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§ 3 3 1 . Gratuitous Licensee Defined
[The Section is omitted. The matter is now covered by
§330.]
§ 3 3 2 . Invitee Defined
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business
visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter
or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to
enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. Invitee. "Invitee" is a word of art, with a special meaning in the law. This meaning is more limited than that of "invitation" in the popular sense, and not all of those who are
invited to enter upon land are invitees. A social guest may be
cordially invited, and strongly urged to come, but he is not an
invitee. (See § 330, Comment h.) Invitees are limited to those
persons who enter or remain on land upon an invitation which
carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make them safe for their reception. Such persons fall
generally into two classes: (1) those who enter as members
of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public; and (2) those who enter for a purpose connected with
the business of the possessor. The second class are sometimes
called business visitors; and a business visitor is merely one kind
of invitee. There are many visitors, such as customers in shops,
who may be placed in either class.
6. Invitation and permission. Although invitation does not
in itself establish the status of an invitee, it is essential to it.
An invitation differs from mere permission in this: an invitation is conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land; permission is conduct
justifying others in believing that the possessor is willing that
they shall enter if they desire to do so. Any words or conduct
See Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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regardless of the manner of entry, so long as the entry itself is
not privileged. The determining fact is the presence or absence
of a privilege to enter or to remain on the land, and the status
of an accidental trespasser is still that of a trespasser.
Illustration:
1. Without any negligence on his part A, standing
on the platform of a subway station of the X Company,
slips and falls onto the tracks. While there he is run over
by the train of X Company, and injured. A is a trespasser,
and the liability to him is determined by the rules stated in
§§ 333 and 336, notwithstanding the accidental character
of his intrusion.
§ 3 3 0 . Licensee Defined
A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. Meaning of "licensee." The definition of "licensee" now
adopted in this Section, and used throughout this Restatement, is
in accord with that which is in common usage by the courts, the
bar, and legal writers. Occasionally, however, other meanings
have been given to the term. In some instances "licensee" has
been used to include any person who enters or remains on land
with the consent of the possessor, including those who are classified as "invitees" under § 332. Where this meaning is given
to "licensee," it becomes necessary to adopt some qualifying
term to apply to those who enter by virtue of the consent given
and nothing more; and such persons are sometimes called "gratuitous," "bare," or "naked" licensees. The great majority of
the decisions continue to distinguish between "licensees" and
"invitees," and to limit "licensee" to those who enter only by
virtue of the consent of the possessor, without more. This definition follows that usage.
Occasionally, also, "licensee" has been used to include those
who enter by authority of law, or under some other privilege,
irrespective of the consent of the possessor. Such persons are
covered in § 345, where the rules stated are the same as those
applicable to licensees as defined in this Section. While there
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and. Cross References
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TOPIC 8. LIABILITY OF PERSONS OTHER THAN A
POSSESSOR, VENDOR, OR LESSOR
Section
380. Trespassers: special rule
[Omitted. See §162.]
381. Trespassers: liability for negligence
382. Members of possessor's household
383. Liability of persons acting on behalf of possessor
384. Liability of persons creating artificial conditions on land on
behalf of possessor for physical harm caused while work
remains in their charge
385. Persons creating artificial conditions on land on behalf of
possessor: physical harm caused after work has been
accepted
386. Persons other than possessor, members of his household, and
those acting on his behalf who create dangerous condition
387. Persons taking over entire charge of land
TOPIC 1. LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF LAND TO
PERSONS ON THE LAND
TITLE A.

DEFINITIONS

§ 3 2 8 E . Possessor of Land Defined
A possessor of land is
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with
intent to control it or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with
intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently
occupied it with intent to control it, or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation
of the land, if no other person is in possession under
Clauses (a) and (b).
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. "Possession" has been given various meanings in the
law, and the term frequently is used to denote the legal relations resulting from facts, rather than in the sense of describing
the facts themselves. It is used here strictly in the factual sense,
because it has been so used in almost all tort cases.
Pee Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT
Buyer represents that the member fbuysj and member may be the seme person! is covered under the buyer's own insurance policies to cover any pergonal injuries to ..>err perso^'iy
or which they may cause to others. The buyer and memb& ogret to dea' directs v\itn buyer's own came/ and not the gym on any claim. Buyer acknowledges that the mernbershrp
cost reflects the savings dut to the fact that the Buyer and Member provide their own insurance and not the Gym ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES
SO AT THEIR OWN RISK it is furtnc agreed that i»l! exercises including the use c>! weights, number of repetition <nd use of any and ail machinery, equipment, and apparatus designed
for exercising snail be at the Buyer and Member's sote ris,k. NoTw;thste**dtng any consultation on exercise programs which may be provided by Gym employres. it <s hereby understood
that the ieiectbr of exercise programs, methods and types cf equipment shall be the Buyei or Member's entire iespon«0*tity ana the Gym she!! not bt liable to Buyer or Member
for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, o' actionc o'smg due to injury to Buyer o« Member, their person, or psoperty prising cut of or m connection with the use by Bu,-er or
Member of thi- service:, end facilities or the premises where the same tr located and Buyer or Member hereby nonJs the Gym. as employee* and agents harmless from aii claims *h/ch
may be brought against them by Buyer or Member or or. either of the.r behalf try sve* in,-urie$ of cla'ms aforesaid Buyer and Member shall also examine each piece of equipment
prior to use and refrain from use and report the same ti there if isny .natation tr.a: the equipment has been subjected to abuse, damaged, or is in ah unsxfci or potentially dangerous
condition Buv'er and Member has * duty to exercise care *cr tne protection ot himself and other members while using the premises If any accident is caused by e defect o; faulty
design of the equipment, the injured party vvili direct any claim against the manufacturer, bonding the- Corporation harmless and subrogate their rights, if an\. to the Corporation Buyer
or Membe; if injured, or Member's representative if Member «s unatic to do so, must complete, sign and del.ver ar\ incident report within seventy two f72i nours ot the time of
occurrence. As to overexertion stresses and Member's own physical condition an6 any other concerns, or, that the Buyer c Member will seek such advice, c:, that Buyer or Member
assume the ru.k of proceeding without such advice Buyer and Member represent tnst they have read and agree to abide by tne rules and regulations of the Gym. Bjyer and Member
agree to lepon any violation cf the rules and regulations t>v other Gym users to employees of the Gym. Notwithstanding the feet that every Gym user has agreed tc abide ny me
rules and regulations. Buyer und Member recognae that Gym employees cannot monitor every Gym user for & violation of the tutes Gym shall no! be liable to Buve* o* Member foi
any claims demands, mjyiies, damages, or actions arising due to breach of the Gym rules by other Gym members or users or any conduct of Gym members or users r a-'ure of Buyei
or Member to comply .vith th>s contract or any rule or regulation snail be cause for revocation of membersh-p without nonce and without tiny liability I or re! und
i have read the foregoing Assumption o! Risk Clause and understand and agree. I further agree that bv signing below l incorporate personal
responsibly fo? els contract terms 'inanaai and oihertv/sV'contained in the r/ntroct as r whole including the reverse side of thi^ agreement-

Buyer / Member Signature

/{j-

A/C(

Buyer / Member Signature y' ,. £- y

ir
\,

/,'

'^rUy<.*^<nr*\_

/

/fjj„ • •. rj.r1. <.rL sCi^rt^,

RULES AND REGULATIONS
(Subject to change without notice)
1 Hours* The hours of operation shall be passed on the premises. Hours
and days of operations shell be subject to Changs m t h * sole discretion
of the Corporation.
2 Holidays or closed days, maintenance- The facilities may t»e temporarily
closed for maintenance purposes. Should the facilities be unavailable for
members use at any other time, due to damage by fire, act of god.
catastrophe, accident or other reason, the membefsfnp will be extended
for a period equal to the time of such unavailability
3. Membership carda/Sign-in All members upon entering are required to
provide Barcode with a photo 10 or other current method of
identification to enter tha gym facilities. Replacement of -ost cards will
be made upon (a! providing proof of membership, (bl providing picture
identification, and {cl paying © reasonable fee. Unauthorized use of caroji
or facilities may subject user and member to civil and/or criminal
penalties.
». Lockers- Lockers are provided as a courtesy lor day use only without
guarantee.
Members are requested to bring their own locks.
Combination locks are preferred, All personal belongings must be placed
m lockers and not left in dressing room booths, THE CORPORATION IS
NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR LOST, STOLEN OR DAMAGED ARTICLES. DO
NOT BRING VALUABLES TO THE PREMISES.
'- \Travel privileges- Use of all Gold Gyms is avertable but not guaranteed.
With « travel pass you may u&e reciprtjeating gyms up to 14 days per
year
®- Guest phvilfefjes Members must present a valid guest pass isee yaus
fitness consultant!, All guests must be 18 years of age and under the
guidance of an instructor. There may be a guest fee attached Guests
who do not present a valid guest pass or guests who are from out of
town, will be assessed a ten dollar ISIOj f w {m %&$ 0 f facilities (Guest
fee may be applied to mentoetship purchase if enrolled t h * day the fee •£
paid!
?, Day &*<*• Supervised Eiay Care ts provided only while the member is
on the gym premises. We are "State Licensed* Management ami stata
regulations Brrtit Day Care hours and rules. Rate and hours may be
changed at management's discretion
8. Cleanliness and Conduct- Sexual harassment will not be tolerated
Suitable, presentable and dean clothing in good repair i t to be worn by
membei at member's own expense. In t h * exercise area, such would
inciudfe gym shorts and i-shirrs or sweatsuits fno swimsuiUij for men ar«S
iaotards oi sweatsuits too iwimsuitsi lot women, together with clean
tennis shoes Bn6 socks. Negative attitudes, threats, fights, of disruptive
or threatening conduct will not be tolerated. Outside business solicitation
wtil not be tolerated in/nt cm the premies.
9
pontesy- To promote safety and effective and more time efficient
exercise programs, remember to return ajt plates, dumbbells and barbells
to designated racis. Ounng high-traffic workout hours, be sure to
encourage members to *work to* with vou between sets during your tost
p*r»rt

'0- EPUI Language- Foul language w«M not be tolerated.
1

* Striking Clause- if ony portion of this contract is found to be m
violation of any laws, it shall be stricken from the contract and shall have
no affect on the viability of the remaining contract terms including the
reverse side of this agreement
12

Other posted rules- Reasonable rules and reguiabana may be posted
ffom time to time regarding the health, protection, or safety of member;-,,
end a« Membership Agreements sJhaff be subject to strict compliance
therewith. Additional rutes for the protection of member and the faciUUei
may be added et any time

13, Violation- Failure by member to comply with this contract or an,- rule
or regulation shall be cause for revocation of membership without any
notice and without any liability for refund.
MEMBER PRIVILEGES
The contract is cancellable upon the following conditions only
1. RelocationEFT; Should a member relocate to a permanent address beyond a 25 m»e
radius from a fuljy reciprocatfng Gold's Gym, this agreement may be
canceled PROVIDING: EFT: I The member provides proof of relocation
acceptable to the gym.tie, powerbitl, lease contract, etc.I 2. All 'monthly
membership payments are current, 3. The rmmb«r peys e one hundred
doBsr f 5100.00} canesRetton fee, 4. A 30 dsy written notice is given Jo
the gym.
PlF/30-60-90: THERE WILL BE NO REFUND OF PREPAID MEMBERSHIP
DUES Prepaid memberships are defined as ell memberships in which lull
payrnem of membership dues i$ ma6e to Gold's Gym in a period of le&s
than 6 months, including all post-dated payments which will reman
property of Gold's Gym. Buyer understands that cancellation of the
contract under the relocation provisions relieves buyer only of his/her
future obligation of monthly dues and does not entitle buyer to refund of
prev-ousry paid membership dyes This contract may not he c&ncehd over
(he phone.
2 Ttansferring
A- Membership may not be transferred to another than those under the
management for Bodyfwm Inc
5 Transferring a membership to another person may occur when the
member has found a buyer who wishes tc fulfill the remaining terms ot
?he contract All payments received by Gcld's Gym will remain property
of Gold's Gym, There is a transfer fee of one hundred dollars C$100 00;
payable to Gold's Gym Only full priced memberships may transfer, nc
family add-on, special price, cornp or trade memberships may transfe'
3- Changes- The only person who can ma«e ony changes or inquires o-*ems contract is the edurt whose name fe on the contract. Otherwise
Gold's Gym needs written notarized consent. This contract mov not be
canceled over the phone
4
Cancellation- Withm three business days alter signing this contract the
buyer may return this contract to the corporate office or send certified
mai5 to Goki's Gym corporate office. A business dsy ts any day of which
the corporate office is open. Without a written cancellation receipt, no
canceUatton wiH be effective. All materia* given at the time of sign up
must b* returned. This contract may not be canceled over the phone

5- Ceased Operation- In the event this Gold's Gym closes and another
simitar gym operated by the Seller or its assignees of the Seller of this
contract is not available within a ten (101 mile redius of the location
wtiete the member is enroPed, Seller .will refund to member a prorata
share of the membership cost, based upon the unused membership time
remaining according to the contract.
6. Fftx^iofl membership- Buyer mpy Umr* membership fry unv reasoft et
; ; twenty-live dollar fj.25; freezing fee. Fietaes must be lor a 30 6bt
rmnimum and a maximum of 24 months. Freezing does not exclude
member from regular payments. Payments due, if any, must be made
during the freeze period. Freeze time is non-transferable The applicable
form must be filled out and signed at the Gym locations. Exceptions may
be made at the discretion of Gold's Gym.
^ Amenities- Amenities and servicer- vary between clubs and
memberships. Gold's Gym reserves the right to change or charge for
specific amenities
8. Minor- AU buywrroembert that sign the membership agreement,
assumption of risk, and rules and regulations shaU be assumed to be IB
years of age or older By signing any of these categories, I incorporate
responsibility of proof oi legal age

Buyer and/or Member have read the foregoing and agree to it.

iifnalatuy
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